

ALLOFAX 23

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY-

REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

COUNTRY Korea

DATE DISTR. 17 MAY 51

SUBJECT Position of KIM Mu-chông

NO. OF PAGES 3

PLACE
ACQUIREDNO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)DATE OF
INFO.SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

50X1-HUM

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT OF
1917, U.S.C. 561 AND 562, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION
OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PRO-
HIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.

*Except as noted

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

50X1-HUM

1. After the end of the war, KIM Il-sông was brought back to Korea immediately, in October 1945, by the Soviet army and was introduced to the citizens of Pyongyang as the new head of the country. KIM returned with no army but under the aegis of the Soviet General Penkovsky. He was already well established and had his support well organized when the Koreans who had been fighting with the Chinese Communist forces began to return to their own country.*
2. One of the outstanding leaders returning from China was KIM Mu-chông,** who arrived on 15 December 1945 with an army which had been aiding the Chinese Communists. As a brilliant military commander backed by a considerable army, he was a popular figure and more attractive to the Koreans than the relatively little known KIM Il-sông. The latter, however, was already well-established politically, and he and his Soviet sponsors took care to neutralize any influence KIM Mu-chông's military strength might convey. The arriving army was immediately disarmed and scattered as far as possible, and when a new People's Army was organized in February 1948, the KIM Mu-chông forces were absorbed into the larger, centrally-controlled unit.
3. When the Asiatic Liberation League held its conference in 1945, the Korea Independence League, which he had organized, tried to send KIM Mu-chông as its delegate. The pro-Soviet Communists, however, opposed KIM and finally the delegate was CH'OM Yong-kôn. KIM was indignant and commenced immediate opposition to the pro-Soviet elements in the Korean Communist Party and then in the North Korean Labor Party. He took the line that the Communists, although they showed capability in organizing the party, were unsystematic in administration, and that Communism was not the best line to follow in public propaganda since Japanese anti-Communist propaganda had made Koreans afraid of the name of Communist and the conduct of the Soviet army in Korea had alienated the Korean pro-Communist intellectuals. The pro-Soviet faction tried to remove KIM completely from party influence and succeeded in pushing him out of the foreground, but his Chinese support was too

COPY
CIRCULATE

CLASSIFICATION				CONFIDENTIAL		DISTRIBUTION	50X1-HUM
STATE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NAVY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NSRB			
ARMY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	AIR		FBI			

Document No.	7
No Change in Class	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Class. Change To:	13 3 C
Auth:	NR 10-2
Date:	16 AUG 1978
By	

50X1-HUM

CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-2-

strong to permit his being entirely eliminated.

4. Admittedly KIM Mu-ch'ong is more distinguished for his military than for his political ability, and this factor made it relatively easy for his opponents to dispose of him within the party and the government. Even in Yen-an, he was considered about fourth man in the New People's Party (predecessor of the Korea Independence League) and concerned himself almost exclusively with military matters, leaving the politics to NAM Pin. His relations with the Chinese and with MAO Tse-tung personally, however, were always good and he commanded the Chinese artillery in the 3 Route Army, being one of two Koreans to hold a Chinese command. He maintained some connections with official Chinese representatives in North Korea after his return, but his prestige gradually waned. How much support he could count on from the Chinese, however, was doubtful even before the war started in June 1950, and it was believed that his influence extended only to a few personal sympathizers and would not be strong enough to induce the Chinese to back him against Soviet opposition. He had, however, the support of the Yen-an faction within the NKLP. 50X1-HUM
5. After a period of virtual retirement, when the North Korean army was formed, KIM was named head of the artillery department and was made a deputy Minister of National Defense in the government. Even in this position he was under the control of the Minister, CH'OE Yong-k'ôn. The Soviet faction continued to try to put him in a position where he could be permanently removed, but his political importance was not apparently great enough to warrant really strenuous efforts. His attempts to return to China, however, were consistently frustrated, and he was never allowed by the KIM Il-s'ong government to make any journeys outside North Korea.
6. KIM was assigned to carry out land reform in Hwanghae Province some time before 1949. On one occasion KIM Il-s'ong as secretary of the North Korean Labor Party, accused KIM Mu-ch'ong of favoring the large land owners, and KIM was formally rebuked by the party. The real reason was not his conduct of the land reform, but his possible political prestige.*** After that, KIM Mu-ch'ong was not heard of, and it was rumored that he had gone to Manchuria.
7. When the North Koreans invaded the south in June 1950, KIM reappeared as commander of the North Korean 4 Corps and fought at the front around the Pusan perimeter in August and September 1950. His headquarters was at Hyopchon. In the retreat from the perimeter, he was put in charge of collection and reorganization of the North Korean troops as they withdrew. The rout was too great, however, and he did not succeed in restoring order. As a result, he was relieved of his command in early November by KIM Ch'aek. 50X1-HUM
8. At a meeting of the North Korean Labor Party on 20 December, KIM was accused of failure to fight aggressively, arbitrary murder of his subordinates, tendencies to attempt to preserve traditions of military caste, and failure to reorganize and mobilize the retreating North Korean troops. The Central Committee voted to expel him from the party. NO Song-taek (李成澤), former Minister of Labor and commander of People's Army Guerrilla Troops from the beginning of the war, was also expelled from the party on similar charges.
9. Political observers believed that the removal of KIM Mu-ch'ong from the party, after so long a period of toleration, at that particular time was part of the effort of the Soviet clique to eliminate from positions of power all party members with influence in China or among Chinese Communists and at the same time to cast on them the responsibility for the North Korean reverses, thus discrediting the Chinese likewise. These moves were assumed to be intended to lessen the amount of pressure the Chinese Communists would be able to apply on the North Korean government in the future. It was reported that powerful leaders of the South Korean Labor Party with Chinese connections were similarly removed from their positions.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

50X1

-3-

10. In early 1951, it was rumored in North Korean political circles that KIM Mu-chong, as a result of the Labor Party decision, had been removed from all official positions. There was an additional rumor that he had been imprisoned.

50X1-HUM

Comment. His name is sometimes given thus, sometime simply as MU Chong, and sometimes as CH'OE Chong. KIM Mu-chong appears to be the most commonly used version.

- *** Comment. O Ki-sop (栗基燮), deputy secretary of the NKLP, received a similar rebuke on different grounds but for the same basic reason: his political importance.

50X1-HUM

CONFIDENTIAL