

CONFIDENTIAL Security Information

INTERROGATION REPORT NO KG 1122 (Cont'd)

- 2. KIM, Ch!aek (分), a Soviet faction man, NKA Vice-Premier and CG, Field Hq, NKA conducted the withdrawal of the NKA from S KOREA in the fall of 1950 very badly. This was particularly true in his handling of the NKA 6th and 12th Divs, made up mainly of ex-CCF men, who suffered extremely heavy casualties. Men of these two Divs criticized KIM bicter v, alleging that he was not only incompetent but had deliberately sacrificed these two units because of the large numbers of ex-CCF men in the Divs.
- 3. MU, Chong (大声), Vice-Minister of National Defense for Arty and CG, NKA II Corps (see Personalities below), was stripped of his rank and position for alleged failures while commanding NKA II Corps and handling the defense of P'YONGYANG. MU, an ex-Arty Brigade CG in the CCF, had once been the political figure backed by the Chinese to take over the leadership of N KOREA. He was expelled from the NKLP at its Dec 50 General Convention, where he was openly and strongly criticized by KIM, Il Song. Most NKA officers felt that MU had deliberately been pushed by KIM into command situations where failure was inevitable. Although the Chinese faction was silent during this action, many were said to have abstained from voting. MU, without any rank or position, was observed by PW at GHQ, NKA in Apr 51, when rumors had started that both the Chinese faction and the CCF were bringing pressure to restore him to a high military post.
- 4. In the shakeup of general officers which followed the disaster of 1950, aprx 10 Maj Gens, including seven Div CGs, most, but not all of whom were ex-CCF men, were reduced to Col or Sen Col for alleged command failure. At the same time, a number of Soviet faction generals who had committed glaring errors were not punished in any way.

Ex-CCF officers in the NKA were not getting promoted at all or were advancing very slowly compared to Soviet faction men. This led to difficulties, especially in high command positions, since the Soviet faction men, compared to ex-CCF men who had had long experience as CCF Regt, Brig and Div commanders, were mostly ex-Soviet Army company grade officers.

MKLP Leaders:

The chairman (左角長) of the NKLP as of Dec 50 was KIM, Il Song. There were four vice-chairmen:

PAK, Hon Yong (村 夏 永), Chief of Political General Bureau, GHQ, NKA; Vice-Promier and Foreign Minister.

KIM, Tu Bong (在科春), Chairman of the Presidium (Executive Committee), Supreme Peoples Council, NKG (see Personalities below).

KIM, Ch'aek (含葉), Vice-Premier; Deputy CinC, NKA. KIM, Ch'aek was killed in Jan 51.


HO, Ka Hua (許 庭), Vice-Minister of Commerce.

As of Aug 51 PW had not heard of any changes in this group except for KIM, Ch'ack.

Special Police Section
Major, NKA (Signal).

P'YONGYANG, KOREA
D/O 1949 to May 51

Source: PW had been in the Hq of this agency in P'YONGYANG and was acquainted with an NKA officer, Maj KIM, Yong Ha (传承河), who was Chief of the Communications Section of this agency. (IN: Information presented here concerning this alleged super-agency for surveillance work



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should be viewed with the utmost reserve, pending further confirmation.)

Identification:

The Special Police Section (增養的) was asserted to be the surveillance agency of the COMINFORM (Communist International Information Bureau, the successor to the Third Communist International) in N KOREA (sic).

Background: PW first heard that the Special Police Section (SPS) was in P'YONGYANG in 1949 (from Maj KIM) but it apparently did not become very active until the start of the Korean War. The SPS's earlier history is unknown.

P'YONGYANG Hq: SPS Hq in P'YÖNGYANG was housed, as of May 51, in aprx 15 underground tunnels dug into the foot of a hill located at aprx 39°02'14" - 125°45'34" (coordinate readings taken from JANIS 75, Plan 42). Entrances to tunnels faced E, toward the TAEDONG River. Tunnel entrances were 30 - 40 m apart and extended along the foot of the hill for aprx 450 m. Tunnels led horizontally straight into the hill, ranging in horizontal depth from 30 to 60 m, and were aprx 3 m high and 6 - 10 m wide, with concrete lined walls and ceilings and wooden floors. A passageway ran along one side of the entire length of the tunnel, the other side being partitioned by wooden planks into a row of offices, detention cells, interrogation booths, etc. Tunnels were equipped with electric lights, telephones, power-driven air circulators and emergency generators.

Organization and Personnel:


According to Maj KIM, there were about 80 men in the P'YONGYANG Hq. KIM also talked as if the SPS had branch offices in all parts of N KOREA but PW knew nothing specific about such offices. SPS agents in P'YONGYANG were of various nationalities - - SOVIET, Korean, Hungarian, Czech, Chinese and possibly others. Soviet personnel seemed to be directing most of the agency's activities, while the field agents were mainly Koreans. There was no particular uniform for SPS agents, who wore whatever civilian clothing or NKA or other uniforms were necessary for their purposes. Maj KIM said that agents normally carried concealed weapons.

PW did not know whether the SPS had any connection with such Soviet agencies as the MGB, MVD or the Soviet Army's Main Administration of Counter-Intelligence. PW had never heard of these agencies nor had he seen any men at the SPS who were the black uniform of the MGB or the green-trimmed hats and epaulets of the MVD.

However, PW's statement that the SPS was the surveillance arm of the COMINFORM was borne out, in his opinion, by statements to this effect by Maj KIM and a number of NKA officers who knew about the agency and the numerous nationalities represented among SPS men.

Authority and Operations: The SPS was concerned with political surveillance of any and all persons in N KOREA. It watched for any signs of political deviation and for failure to carry out assigned tasks. In actual practice, it concentrated on higher-ranking civil and military officials. Minor cases were turned over to the NKA or NKG civil authorities.

According to Maj KIM, it could, in theory at least, arrest and execute any person without trial or explanation. PW had not heard of any cases in which persons were actually executed by the SPS. Whether it had any jurisdiction over CCF men was unknown. PW had never heard of any high-ranking CCF men being arrested by the SPS.



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The SPS was said to have undercover agents in the NKA, the NKG, the Soviet Military Advisory Mission and even in the chief N Korean political surveillance agencies, the Local Security Ministry and the NKA Political au. Security Bureau.

SPS Cases:

The SPS was reputed by some NKA officers to have been instrumental in bringing about action in the following cases of which PW had knowledge:

- 1. Lt Gen KIM, Il (底 日), Vice-Minister of National Defense for Culture, who was removed in Dec 50 for having said that without planes the NKA could not fight UN forces and for generally having taken a defeatist line. KIM was relegated to a position as a minor official in the Ministry of Communications.
- 2. HO, Song T'ack (許成澤), NKG Labor Minister, who was accused of having failed to carry out orders to organize workers and peasants under MKLP leadership into effective guerilla units during the retreat of the NKA in the fall of 1950. HO was removed from his position and assigned as a Deputy Political Commisser of the NKA 32d Div.
- 3. Lt Gen MU, Chong (利), Vice-Minister of National Defense for Arty and a Corps CG, who was stripped of his rank for failure to follow orders.
- 4. Soviet advisors to the NKA were removed in some instances and sent back to the USSR or relegated to unimportant positions for failure to meet their responsibilities.
- 5. The NKA CinC, KIM, Il Song was not immune from the SPS. After broadcasting a New Year's greeting to the people in Jan 51, KIM. was accosted by an SPS agent, a Korean, who warned him in abusive language that parts of his speech were in political error. The source of this story was Lt LEE, In No (文 化), a Signal Officer in the CinC's office, who allegedly heard the conversation through the walls of the partition between his office and that of KIM, Il Song.


Murder of the Wife of KIM, Il Song Major. NK/. (Signal)

N KOREA D/O Late 1949 to Mar 50.

(IN: The following account summarizes general talk, and rumors in the NKA concerning this case. The alleged conversation between KIM, Il Song and an agent or agents of the Special Police Section was described to PW by Lt LEE, In No (空台區), a GHQ Signal Officer who in turn heard it from a telephone operator in KIM, Il Song's office. While this account must necessarily be viewed with considerable reserve, it nevertheless appears to be of some intelligence value.)

Mme KIM, Chong Suk (食 点 版), aged 35, the wife of KIM, Il Song, married him in about 1935. She was a member of the same guerilla force in MANCHURIA in which KIM served. She was a member of the CCP and later of the NKLP. She returned to KOREA in 1945 and became politically active as a member of the Central Committee, General Federation of Women (+ 14 12)

同盟中央走賣會)。 Mme KIM was a well-built woman, apparently in excellent health and reputed to be a crack rifle and pistol shot.



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During late 1949 and early 1950, she expressed to her husband on several occasions her opposition to the war for which the NKA was obviously preparing. According to several NKA officers who claimed to be quoting directly what members of the KIM's household had overheard, Mme KIM told the Premier on one occasion: "The policy of preparation for war which you are pursuing will result in war between people of the same race. To resort to war would kill any hope of union. There is no support among the people for such a war. And supposing you fail - - - - what then?"

Word of Mme KIM's feelings reached the COMINFORM's Special Police Section and an agent or agents of this section went to see KIM and allegedly told him: "Your wife has lost the true spirit of the international Communist. She has disclosed important secrets and will continue to be a source of danger to us. For these reasons, should she not be removed?" KIM agreed.

In Mar 50, it was publicly announced that Mme KIM had died suddenly of an illness, the nature of which was not disclosed.

It was the general belief in the NKA that agents of the Special Police Section had murdered the woman. KIM himself was not believed to have had a direct hand in his wife's death. Another rumor was that KIM had killed his wife because of another woman, a belief held by many, especially after he remarried in May 50 - - - this time the daughter of LEE, Kuk No (本意意), Minister without Portfolio in the NKG Cabinet.

This rumor died out after the war started and the general belief now is that Mme KIM had been liquidated for political reasons.

Social Security Ministry (SSM), NK Government Major, NKA (Signal)

KOREA D/O Apr - Jul 51

Observation:

The following information is based partly on common knowledge and hear-say. The SSM was also the subject of frequent, although guarded commont among NKA officers.

PW also had first-hand contact with the SSM. He was arrested by an SSM agent at KANGGYE (江東) on 15 Jul 51 and was held and interrogated by the CHAGANG-DO (至江道) Provincial SS Section till 28 Jul 51 when he was tried and sentenced to death for forgery of official seals, desertion and theft of military property, although he later escaped.

This experience gave him a limited amount of concrete details about SSM operations, as well as organization at provincial and local levels. The fact that the SSM was a security police agency, that it was only established in Apr 51, that there was no publicizing of its activities and that PW had no official connection with it, necessarily limits the scope of his knowledge.

Reliability of general information would seem to be fair, although reliability of information derived from PW's own experience with the SSM is regarded as good.

Namo:

The N Korean name of the Social Security Ministry " 社 有 生 道 " might be more properly translated as "Civil Security Ministry", for the following reasons: