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[[김정숙 (김일성처)|김정숙]] 사후에 [[김일성]]은 1950년 1월 [https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%9D%B4%EA%B7%B9%EB%A1%9C 이극로(李克魯)]가 아니라 [ | [[김정숙 (김일성처)|김정숙]] 사후에 [[김일성]]은 1950년 1월 [https://ko.wikipedia.org/wiki/%EC%9D%B4%EA%B7%B9%EB%A1%9C 이극로(李克魯)]가 아니라 [[홍명희|홍명희(洪命憙)]]의 딸과 결혼했으나 일찍 죽은 것으로 보이고, 그후 김성애와 다시 결혼했다.<ref>[[김일성#김일성의 처와 자녀]]</ref> | ||
==참고 자료== | ==참고 자료== |
2022년 4월 10일 (일) 16:10 기준 최신판
![](/w/images/thumb/b/b8/SPS_%ED%8A%B9%EA%B2%BD%EB%B6%80.pdf/page1-300px-SPS_%ED%8A%B9%EA%B2%BD%EB%B6%80.pdf.jpg)
특경부(特警部, Special Police Section)는 북한 정권 공식 출범후부터 6.25 전쟁 기간에 북한에 존재했던 코민포름(Cominform) 산하의 북한정권 감시기구이다. 이러한 기구의 존재는 6.25 때 미군이 인민군 포로를 신문하여 얻은 정보 기록에 나온다. 1948년 9월 북한 정권 수립과 함께 소련군 철수 후 평양의 소련 대사관이 북한 정권을 감독하는 일을 맡으면서 감시기구로 설치한 것으로 보이나 자세한 사항은 알려져 있지 않다.
개요
특경부(特警部, Special Police Section)는 북한 정권 공식 출범후부터 6.25 전쟁 기간에 북한에 존재했던 코민포름(Cominform, Communist Information Bureau, or Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties)[2][3] 산하의 감시기관이다. 북한 정권 수립과 함께 1948년말 소련군이 철수한 후 소련 군정청은 해체되고 대신 평양의 소련 대사관이 북한 정권을 감독하는 일을 맡으면서 감시기구로 설치한 것으로 보이나 자세한 사항은 알려져 있지 않다.
이러한 기구의 존재는 6.25 때 미군이 인민군 포로를 신문하여 얻은 정보 기록에 나온다.[1]
특경부는 평양에 본부를 두고 북한의 각 지방에 지부를 두었으며, 평양본부의 인원은 소련인, 한국인, 헝가리인, 체코인, 중국인 등 각국의 사람들로 구성되었고, 소련인들이 기구의 활동을 지시했다.
평양의 본부는 지하에 터널을 파서 만들어졌으며, 80여명의 인원이 있었다.
김일성 본인도 특경부의 감시로부터 자유롭지 않았다고 하므로 소련은 6.25 전쟁 시기에도 북한에서 감시기구를 운영하며 절대적인 영향력을 행사하고 있었던 것으로 보인다. 1951년 1월에 김일성이 행한 신년사 연설이 정치적 오류가 있다며 특경부의 비판을 받았다고 한다.
김일성의 처 김정숙이 남침전쟁 계획에 반대하다 특경부에 의해 살해됐다는 소문이 돌 정도로 공포의 대상이었던 듯하다. 다만 김정숙이 1950년 3월 병으로 죽었다고 발표했다는데 실제로는 1949년 9월 22일에 죽었으므로, 이러한 소문은 사실로 보기는 어렵지만, 그녀가 생전에 남침계획을 알고 반대를 했을 가능성은 있는 것같다. 김일성은 일찍부터 남침을 계획하고 있었지만 김정숙이 사망할 때까지는 스탈린의 승인을 얻지 못하고 있었으므로, 김정숙이 전쟁을 반대한다고 특경부가 그녀를 살해했을 가능성은 없어 보인다.
미군의 특경부 관련 포로 신문 기록
6.25 때 포로가 된 문만순(MUN, Man Sun, 文萬淳)이라는 인민군 통신대 (Signal Corps) 소좌(Major, 소령)에 대한 미군의 신문 기록에 특경부(特警部, Spccial Police Section)와 관련된 내용이 나오는데, 아래와 같다. PW (Prisoner of War)는 포로가 된 문만순 인민군 소좌를 가리키며, 그는 1951년 9월 17일 강원도 고성에서 포로로 잡혔다.(p.18)
- RG 319, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Intelligence), Intelligence Document File Publication 1947-62, Entry # 1004H (UD), ID 950054 : ATIS-FEC Interrogation Report, Box No. 334, 950054 KG 1121, etc. (NARA 문서 : 국사편찬위 전자사료관) pp.23~26 (MUN, Man Sun, 文萬淳 신문 기록 pp.6~9)
- COMINFORM : Communist Information Bureau
- PW : Prisoner of War
- Hq : Headquarters ; GHQ : General Headquarters
- aprx : approximately
- CCF : Chinese Communist Forces (중공군)
- CCP : Chinese Communist Party (중국공산당)
- CinC : Commander in Chief (최고사령관)
- NKG : North Korean Government
- NKA : North Korean Army
- NKLP : North Korean Labor Party (북조선노동당)
- Lt Gen : Lieutenant General (중장)
- Maj : Major (소좌, 소령)
- MGB : Ministry of State Security (Soviet Union)
- MVD : Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russia) - NKVD가 1946년에 바꾼 이름.
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INTERROGATION REPORT NO KG 1122 (Cont'd)
Special Police Section
Major, NKA (Signal)
P'YONGYANG, KOREA
D/O 1949 to May 51
Source: PW had been in the Hq of this agency in P'YONGYANG and was acquainted with an NKA officer, Maj KIM, Yong Ha (金永河), who was Chief of the Communications Section of this agency. (IN: Information presented here concerning this alleged super-agency for surveillance work
CONFIDENTIAL Security Information
INTERROGATION REPORT NO KG 1122 (Cont'd)
should be viewed with the utmost reserve, pending further confirmation.)
Identification:
The Spccial Police Section (特警部) was asserted to be the surveillance agency of the COMINFORM (Communist International Information Bureau, the successor to the Third Communist International) in N KOREA (sic).
Background: PW first heard that the Special Police Section (SPS) was in P'YONGYANG in 1949 (from Maj KIM) but it apparently did not become very active until the start of the Korean War. The SPS's earlier history is unknown.
P'YONGYANG Hq: SPS Hq in P'YONGYANG was housed, as of May 51, in aprx 15 underground tunnels dug into the foot of a hill located at aprx 39°02'14" - 125°45'34" (coordinate readings taken from JANIS 75, Plan 42). Entrances to tunnels faced E, toward the TAEDONG River, Tunnel entrances were 30 - 40 m apart and extended along the foot of the hill for aprx 450 m. Tunnels led horizontally straight into the hill, ranging in horizontal depth from 30 to 60 m, and were aprx 3 m high and 6 - 10 m wide, with concrete lined walls and ceilings and wooden floors, A passageway ran along one side of the entire length of the tunnel, the other side being partitioned by wooden planks into a row of offices, detention cells, interrogation booths, etc. Tunnels were equipped with electric lights, telephones, power-driven air circulators and emergency generators.
Organization and Personnel:
According to Maj KIM, there were about 80 men in the P'YONGYANG Hq. KIM also talked as if the SPS had branch offices in all parts of N KOREA but all knew nothing specific about such offices. SPS agents in P'YONGYANG were of various nationalities - - SOVIET, Korean, Hungarian, Czech, Chinese and possibly others. Soviet personnel seemed to be directing most of the agency's activities, while the field agents were mainly Koreans. There was no particular uniform for SPS agents, who wore whatever civilian clothing or NKA, or other uniforms were necessary for their purposes. Maj KIM said that agents normally carried concealed weapons.
PW did not know whether the SPS had any connection with such Soviet agencies as the MGB, MVD or the Soviet Army's Main Administration of Counter-Intelligence. PW had never heard of these agencies nor had he seen any men at the SPS who wore the black uniform of the MGB or the green-trimmed hats and epaulets of the MVD.
However, PW's statement that the SPS was the surveillance arm of the COMINFORM was borne out, in his opinion, by statements to this effect by Maj KIM and a number of NKA officers who knew about the agency and the numerous nationalities represented among SPS men.
Authority and Operations: The SPS was concerned with political surveillance of any and all persons in N KOREA. It watched for any signs of political deviation and for failure to carry out assigned tasks. In actual practice, it concentrated on higher-ranking civil and military officials. Minor cases were turned over to the NKA or NKG civil authorities.
According to Maj KIM, it could, in theory at least, arrest and execute any person without trial or explanation. PW had not heard of any cases in which persons were actually executed by the SPS. Whether it had any jurisdiction over CCF men was unknown. PW had never heard of any high-ranking CCF men being arrested by the SPS.
CONFIDENTIAL Security Information
INTERROGATION REPORT NO KG 1122 (Cont'd)
The SPS was said to have undercover agents in the NKA, the NKG, the Soviet Military Advisory Mission and even in the chief N Korean political surveillance agencies, the Local Security Ministry and the NKA Political Security Bureau.
SPS Cases:
The SPS was reputed by some NKA officers to have been instrumental in bringing about action in the following cases of which PW had knowledge:
1. Lt Gen KİM, Il (金日), Vice-Minister of National Defense for Culture, who was removed in Dec 50 for having said that without planes the NKA could not fight UN forces and for generally having taken a defeatist line. KIM was relegated to a position as a minor official in the Ministry of Communications.
2. HO, Song T'aek (許成澤), NKG Labor Minister, who was accused of having failed to carry out orders to organize workers and peasants under NKLP leadership into effective guerrilla units during the retreat of the NKA in the fall of 1950. HO was removed from his position and assigned as a Deputy Political Commissar of the NKA 32d Div.
3. Lt Gen MU, Chong (武亭), Vice-Minister of National Defense for Arty and a Corps CG, who was stripped of his rank for failure to follow orders.
4. Soviet advisors to the NKA were removed in some instances and sent back to the USSR or relegated to unimportant positions for failure to meet their responsibilities.
5. The NKA CinC, KIM, Il Song was not immune from the SPS. After broadcasting a New Year's greeting to the people in Jan 51, KIM was accosted by an SPS agent, a Korean, who warned him in abusive language that parts of his speech were in political error. The source of this story was Lt LEE, In No (李仁露), a Signal Officer in the CinC's office, who allegedly heard the conversation through the walls of the partition between his office and that of KIM, Il Song.
Murder of the Wife of KIM, Il Song
Major, NKA (Signal)
N KOREA
D/O Late 1949 to Mar 50.
(IN: The following account summarizes general talk and rumors in the NKA concerning this case. The alleged conversation between KIM, Il Song and an agent or agents of the Special Police Section was described to PW by Lt LEE, In No (李仁露), a GHQ Signal Officer who in turn heard it from a telephone operator in KIM, Il Song's office. While this account must necessarily be viewed with considerable reserve, it nevertheless appears to be of some intelligence value.)
Mme KIM, Chong Suk (金貞淑), aged 35, the wife of KIM, Il Song, married him in about 1935. She was a member of the same guerrilla force in MANCHURIA in which KIM served. She was a member of the CCP and later of the NKLP. She returned to KOREA in 1945 and became politically active as a member of the Central Committee, General Federation of Women (女性總同盟中央委員會). Mme KIM was a well-built woman, apparently in excellent health and reputed to be a crack rifle and pistol shot.
CONFIDENTIAL Security Information
INTERROGATION REPORT NO KG 1122 (Cont'd)
During late 1949 and early 1950, she expressed to her husband on several occasions her opposition to the war for which the NKA was obviously preparing. According to several NKA officers who claimed to be quoting directly what members of the KIM's household had overheard, Mme KIM told the Premier on one occasion: "The policy of preparation for war which you are pursuing will result in war between people of the same face. To resort to war would kill any hope of union. There is no support among the people for such a war. And supposing you fail - - - - what then?"
Word of Mme KIM's feelings reached the COMINFORM's Special Police Section and an agent or agents of this section went to see KIM and allegedly told him: "Your wife has lost the true spirit of the international Communist. She has disclosed important secrets and will continue to be a source of danger to us. For these reasons, should she not be removed?" KIM agreed.
In Mar 50, it was publicly announced that Mme KIM had died suddenly of an illness, the nature of which was not disclosed.
It was the general belief in the NKA that agents of the Special Police Section had murdered the woman. KIM himself was not believed to have had a direct hand in his wife's death. Another rumor was that KIM had killed his wife because of another woman, a belief held by many, especially after he remarried in May 50 - - - this time the daughter of LEE, Kuk No (李克魯), Minister without Portfolio in the NKG Cabinet.
This rumor died out after the war started and the general belief now is that Mme KIM had been liquidated for political reasons.
CONFIDENTIAL Security Information
김정숙 사후에 김일성은 1950년 1월 이극로(李克魯)가 아니라 홍명희(洪命憙)의 딸과 결혼했으나 일찍 죽은 것으로 보이고, 그후 김성애와 다시 결혼했다.[4]
참고 자료
아래에도 포로 문만순(文萬淳) 소좌에 대한 심문 기록이 더 나오지만, 특경부에 대한 내용은 보이지 않는다. 문만순은 반공적인 경향의 사람으로 전투 중에 포로가 된 것이 아니라 자진 투항한 것으로 보인다.
아래 자료들은 국사편찬위원회 전자사료관에 올라 있다.
- pp.299 ~ 333 : Mun, Man Sun(文萬淳)의 조부 문창흥(文昌興)은 독립운동을 함.
- p.86 ~ : Mun, Man Sun(文萬淳)
- p.55 ~ : Mun, Man Sun(文萬淳)